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Protecting Subjects’ Interests in Genetics Research
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Biomedical researchers often assume that sponsors, subjects, families, and disease-associated advocacy groups
contribute to research solely because of altruism. This view fails to capture the diverse interests of many participants
in the emerging research enterprise. In the past two decades, patient groups have become increasingly active in the
promotion and facilitation of genetics research. Simultaneously, a significant shift of academic biomedical science
toward commercialization has occurred, spurred by U.S. federal policy changes. The concurrent rise in both the
roles that subjects play and the commercial interests they have presents numerous ethical challenges. We examine
the interests of different research participants, finding that these interests are not addressed by current policies and
practices. We conclude that all participants should be given a voice in decisions affecting ownership, access to, and
use of commercialized products and services, and that researchers and institutions should negotiate issues relating
to control of research results and the sharing of benefits before the research is performed.
Discoveries made with your DNA samples may be patented by us and
the University. These patents may be sold or licensed, which could give a
company the sole right to make and sell products or offer testing based on
the discovery. Royalties may be paid to us, the University, and the Sponsor.
It is not our intent to share any of these possible royalties with you.
The paragraph above is from a prototypical consent form
for DNA banking in genetics research. The statement re-
flects the prevalent view among researchers, institutions,
and sponsors in regard to the allocation of intellectual
property rights and associated monies that result from
such research (Beskow et al. 2001). As reflected in stan-
dardized consent forms, current institutional policies and
practices that govern biomedical research assume that
subjects act solely because of altruism and that the sole
duty of researchers is to disclose their intentions, rather
than to recognize any interest of subjects in commercial
products that may result from the research. This viewwas
fostered by the California Supreme Court, when, more
than a decade ago, it held that John Moore did not have
a property interest in his tissues, but only had a right to
be informed about both the intent to develop a cell line
and the potential commercial interests of the clinician re-
searchers with whom he interacted (Moore v. Regents of
the University of California 1990).
This view fails to capture the myriad interests and
motives of the different actors involved in the research
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enterprise, including academic scientists, public and pri-
vate sponsors, commercial institutions, patient groups,
and research subjects themselves. A consideration of
these interests reveals many areas of potential conflict.
The resolution of these issues early in the research pro-
cess may facilitate research and better protect the rights
and interests of patients and research subjects.
The Emerging Collaborative-Research Enterprise
Patient groups are becoming more active in the pro-
motion and facilitation of preclinical and clinical re-
search. Although patient groups have long played a key
role through participation in research (e.g., by helping
coordinate subject identification and recruitment and
fund-raising to support research), a new type of rela-
tionship is emerging as groups become key players in
the promotion of studies of the causal role of genetics
in diseases (Lindee 2000). This developing role has oc-
curred concurrently with two other significant changes
in biomedical research: the creation and rapid evolution
of technology transfer and the explosion in biotechnol-
ogy science and investment. The concurrent rise in re-
search subjects’ roles and commercial interests raises
new ethical and policy challenges.
Various groups have started or are starting founda-
tions for the funding of research, compiling disease-
specific registries of patients and genealogical and med-
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ical databases, establishing tissue and DNA banks to
provide resources crucial for genetics research, and de-
veloping scientific expertise that can make substantive
contributions to the direction and performance of re-
search. Demonstrating the number and breadth of in-
terest groups, the Genetic Alliance lists more than 500
members from family and patient support groups, ad-
vocacy groups, health professionals, universities, com-
panies, and the government. Individuals involved in
these initiatives and their families often participate di-
rectly in research. The resultant close collaborative re-
lationships with scientists greatly facilitate targeted re-
search by providing access to affected communities,
giving highly motivated assistance in identifying and
soliciting potential participants from these communi-
ties, giving credibility to the researchers that can in-
crease trust and participation, and sharing the costs of
recruitment.
Several recent examples illustrate the range of subject
and group involvement. These examples suggest that
the nature of the relationships that exist between pa-
tients, their families and the larger community of fam-
ilies at risk, and the genetics research community is
changing. These cases reveal that the participants can
have different interests in the outcomes of research and
that these interests may conflict with those of other ac-
tors. By identifying the interests in the products and
benefits of research that are at stake, we hope to begin
a conversation and negotiation among those involved
to develop policies for protecting the interests of subjects
that will allocate the costs, burdens, and benefits in an
equitable manner.
Canavan Disease
Dan and Debbie Greenberg and their children and
more than 150 other families from around the world
participated in an extensive collaborative relationship
with Dr. Reuben Matalon that led fruitfully to the dis-
covery of the aspartoacylase gene in 1993 (Kaul et al.
1993). These families participated in the studies; helped
identify, solicit, and collect blood samples from other
afflicted families; and secured research support from the
Canavan Foundation, the National Tay Sachs and Allied
Diseases Association, the United Leukodystrophy Foun-
dation, and various local groups. Rabbi Josef Ekstein,
Executive Director of Dor Yeshorim–Committee for
Prevention of Jewish Genetic Diseases, in Brooklyn,
provided access to approximately six thousand stored
blood samples. These were used by the researchers to
rapidly identify several mutations in Ashkenazi Jewish
families and to estimate population frequencies (Kaul
et al. 1994).
Unbeknownst to the families, the researchers and
Miami Children’s Hospital (MCH) secured U.S. pat-
ent 5,679,635, which covered all diagnostic and ther-
apeutic uses of the gene in October 1997. MCH em-
barked on what the families believed to be a restrictive
and unduly expensive licensing program. On October
30, 2000, three involved families, the National Tay
Sachs and Allied Diseases Association, and Dor Yesh-
orim filed suit against MCH, in an attempt to prevent
continued use of the patent in a manner that the plain-
tiffs believe is immoral, unfair to those who made the
research possible, and likely to restrict access to the
test (Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital 2000;
Marshall 2000).
Pseudoxanthoma Elasticum (PXE)
In the mid-1990s, Sharon Terry created PXE Inter-
national (Kolata 2000b). The foundation helped identify
and solicit participation from affected families, estab-
lished a registry and a repository, and raised money to
support studies through use of these resources. PXE In-
ternational negotiated with researchers to whom they
provided support and access to biomaterials for re-
search, and through use of Material Transfer Agree-
ments, retained authorship in any papers and ownership
rights in any patents, to ensure broad and affordable
availability of the test and to retain influence over down-
stream development (Pennisi 2000; Smaglik 2000). The
gene implicated in the disorder was identified in early
2000 (Bergen et al. 2000; Le Saux et al. 2000), and the
foundation’s ownership increases the likelihood that the
interests of those most affected by PXE will be repre-
sented in decisions about licensing and treatment re-
search and development.
a-1-Antitrypsin Deficiency
The Alpha-1 Foundation was created to expedite re-
search into therapies and a cure for a-1-antitrypsin de-
ficiency. The Foundation has provided monetary re-
search support, it has created a confidential research
registry as well as a DNA bank, it sponsors annual re-
search symposia, and it helped secure funding for a pro-
gram and faculty chair at the University of Florida. The
Foundation is developing proactive policies that will best
protect the interests of the a-1-antitrypsin deficiency
community in new discoveries resulting from collabo-
rative and sponsored research, while directly promoting
research for treatments and a cure.
Recognizing Interests in Genetics Research
The current “market” in genetics research includes pa-
tients and families, disease-associated advocacy groups,
foundations, governmental agencies such as theNational
Institutes of Health (NIH), researchers, universities, bi-
otechnology firms, and pharmaceutical companies. All
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Figure 1 A heuristic method for consideration of interests of
various actors involved in genetics research. All actors may be influ-
enced in part by any of these factors, but we posit that some interests
will dominate, as suggested by deeper shading of the intersecting boxes.
have common goals: the discovery of the genetic causes
of disease, the broad availability of testing to patients,
and, ultimately, the development of treatments or cures.
However, individuals and groups have more diverse in-
terests, motivations, and incentives for performing,
funding, participating in, and promoting research. It is
important to understand those interests to develop strat-
egies that best satisfy all of the parties. Of course, not
all interests and motives can be captured in an analysis
such as this, but our generalizations may help the un-
derstanding of what the limits of our knowledge are in
this area, by spurring conversation among interested
parties, and may provide a foundation for basic policies
that can be adapted to different needs and situations.
The key interests that typify the contributions of
firms, foundations, government, researchers, advocacy
groups, and patient participants are presented in figure
1 and include the following:
1. Financial return. Contributions to research are
treated as investments on which a monetary reward and
reasonable rate of return is expected and, to the extent
feasible, negotiated. The type of investments may be fi-
nancial or otherwise, but here the payoffs are expected
to be monetary.
2. Therapy. Various actors invest money, time, ex-
pertise, and other resources for fundamental knowledge
about the disease, development and provision of carrier,
prenatal, and population-screening tests, and ultimately
development of preventative measures, treatments, and
cures. The motive here is self-interest in treatment or
cure for a disease.
3. Ego (self-esteem). Motivation comes from the in-
tangible rewards of reputation, notoriety, prizes, and
awards.
4. Intellectual curiosity. Reflecting the very basic sci-
entific motives of seeking knowledge, making discov-
eries, and understanding the world around us, intellec-
tual curiosity is distinguished from therapy, in that
knowledge is valued in itself, independently of its in-
strumental value as a relief from disease.
5. Altruism. Contributions of money, time, and ac-
tive research promotion and participation are treated as
an unalloyed gift to help those who will most benefit in
the future from the potential fruits of the research. Under
a pure altruism model, there is no expectation of return
or personal benefit.
6. Duty. Individuals, professionals, and organiza-
tions are obliged to act for the good of others. Patients
and those who act as their advocates may feel obligated
to promote and participate in research for themselves,
for their families, and for those in the affected or at-risk
disease community; government may be compelled to
support research on behalf of citizens who are or may
be afflicted, to promote the public health, or even for
reasons of foreign policy or national security.
Figure 1 graphically depicts the contrasting interests of
different research participants, providing a heuristic
method that permits the express consideration of inter-
ests. From our consideration of these interests, we have
drawn various inferences.
Biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms will invest
risk capital in downstream research and development,
such as taking a promising drug through animal and
human testing, only if they are assured of some measure
of market exclusivity. Any retained interests of research
collaborators or of those who made upstream discov-
eries increases the risk and depresses the motivation for
the firm to undertake a development effort (Heller and
Eisenberg 1998). The firm rightfully operates for the
purpose of earning a return on its investment, and the
motivations for performing research are largely—if not
entirely—financial. We believe, however, that the firm
should be willing to compensate those who contribute
to its research and development efforts, but demands
must be reasonable in relation to the contributions, the
likely payoffs, and the risks of the research. Simply, any
economic actor who draws on and profits from re-
sources such as public funds or participation by collab-
orating disease-associated advocacy groups should not
be freely permitted to use and profit from those public
and private resources without paying for them.
Understanding the motives and interests of univer-
sities is more problematic. Arguably, the primary pur-
pose of a research university is to contribute to learning
and development of new knowledge. These institutions
are typically nonprofit, reflecting that they have duties
to society to contribute to the public welfare. But the
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institutions have also become increasingly capitalist
ventures, centered around technology transfer. Tech-
nology-transfer departments are permitted by federal
law to cover patenting and licensing expenses with roy-
alty income and typically will return portions of excess
revenue to faculty and their departments, as well as to
the university itself for educational and research pur-
poses (U.S. Code 2001). Universities, then, may be
viewed as schizophrenic, defending the open and free
sharing of ideas traditionally valued in the academy
while simultaneously pursuing the protection of intel-
lectual property and profits.
Technology-transfer programs have, in turn, created
a monetary incentive for researchers themselves, who
can earn quite substantial sums from inventions licensed
to industry as well as from more-direct commercial ties,
such as equity ownership in commercial ventures. De-
spite growing concerns about financial conflicts of in-
terest (Cho et al. 2000; DeAngelis 2000), the incidence
of financial incentives and relationships has become
more prevalent within the biomedical research com-
munity (Krimsky et al. 1996; Angell 2000). We posit
that government and university researchers remain pri-
marily motivated by intellectual curiosity and academic
freedom, for they likely could earn higher salaries in
industry (Kreeger 2001).
One of the most difficult issues that NIH, other federal
and state funding agencies, and nonprofit foundations
face is the assurance that their financial sponsorship of
research promotes the greatest public good. On the one
hand, patenting and technology transfer are viewed as
effective tools for promoting disclosure of inventions,
spurring investment, rewarding success, and moving ba-
sic research off the bench and into the marketplace. In-
tellectual property rights can ensure firms the exclusivity
they need to justify expenditures of risk capital for de-
velopment of marketable products and services. On the
other hand, these public institutions—alongwith patients
and advocacy organizations—should be wary of having
their expenditures totally appropriated by private firms
or universities. Although citizens, patients, and patients’
advocates want treatments and cures, they also want
these to be available at reasonable prices so that they will
be broadly accessible by the community. They also do
not want to be made to pay twice for an invention re-
sulting from research to which they materially contrib-
uted, with financial, scientific, participatory, or other
kinds of assistance—once through their direct support
and “again through higher monopoly prices and re-
stricted supply” (Eisenberg 1996). Justice concerns arise
if the costs of products are set too high and result in
material inequities in access by participants.
Of course, it is problematic to assume that govern-
ment, private foundations, or patient advocacy groups
established by affected families will necessarily reflect
the interests and values of those afflicted with a partic-
ular disease. These groups often reflect the interests and
perspectives of a relatively small number in the com-
munity who happen to be particularly active. Some-
times, competing goals and priorities emerge that lead
to the creation of separate institutions. In several cases,
separate foundations have evolved, with one focusing
on issues such as political advocacy, prevention, and
education while another seeks the development of ther-
apies and a cure.
Although we cannot say that the interests of patients
and advocacy groups are identical, we believe that these
organizations are the best situated to represent, protect,
and serve the interests of those most affected. First, for
genetic diseases, there is a sense in which the affected
families have “voted.” As in the case of PXE, families
have joined the group, put their names in a registry, and
perhaps even deposited their genetic material for re-
search, clearly indicating support for the institution and
its representation of their interests. Second, other insti-
tutions and individuals (e.g., companies, researchers,
and universities) do not have the interests of the affected
families as their primary interests. As we noted above,
companies have financial obligations to their stock-
holders and to the bottom line. Researchers have ob-
ligations to develop knowledge and to meet the needs
of their universities. Only the patient advocacy and sup-
port groups have the interests of the affected families
as their primary interests, even if they have other in-
terests as well.
The difficult balancing suggested above has led to
policies—particularly within the federal government—
that favor nonexclusive over exclusive licensing, except
in cases in which substantial investment farther down-
stream is required to bring an invention to market (Katz
and Merz 2001). In the 1980s, there was also a regu-
latory attempt to require the “reasonable pricing” of
products developed under Cooperative Research and
Development Agreements between industry and the fed-
eral government (Brody 1996). The financial risk posed
by such conditions were viewed as an impediment to
downstream investment, and these requirements were
dropped. Notwithstanding, the federal government does
not give away its inventions; the NIH collected royalties
of more than $50 million in fiscal year 2000, which
funds are used to reward inventors, pay licensing ex-
penses in the Institutes and Centers, and sponsor edu-
cational and research activities (Office of Technology
Transfer, PHS/NIH).
To the extent that royalties—including those paid to
the government—raise prices to consumers, there is a
fundamental justice issue in how such royalties are dis-
tributed. If the royalties are used to fund downstream
development—say, of therapies, the costs of these efforts
will effectively be internalized to the community most
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likely to benefit from them. This should be acceptable
to the community, as long as the costs do not lead to
material inequities in access. If the money is, instead,
used to reward prior discovery or treated as profit or
other return on the contribution of the community, then
it may be less acceptable. In our view, fairness demands
that profits be distributed among those who contributed
to the research in an equitable manner. The patient com-
munity may not want a financial return, instead pre-
ferring to have an influence on access, pricing, and the
terms guiding ownership and control of downstream
developments.
Current policies and practices in research largely re-
flect none of these interests, and the default stipulation
noted in the beginning of this essay that there will be
no sharing of financial returns with subjects fails to
respect the contributions, or protect the interests, of
subjects and the disease communities they seek to help
(Weijer and Emanuel 2000). Strategies and policies that
respect the contributions of the many involved parties
need to be developed. For example, for products re-
sulting from population-based studies, the Human Ge-
nome Organisation (HUGO) Ethics Committee rec-
ommended that ∼1%–3% of net profits be returned to
the populations, to support humanitarian aid or health
care infrastructure (HUGO Ethics Committee 2000;
Weijer 2000; Berg 2001). This rate was arbitrarily cho-
sen and does not reflect any economic analysis of rel-
ative contribution or fairness. Others have recom-
mended that even greater amounts be shared with
subjects (Weir and Horton 1995). As a very-well-pub-
licized example, deCODE Genetics of Iceland executed
an agreement with the Icelandic government in 2000.
This license granted, to deCODE, the exclusive use of
a centrally compiled population health database, which
deCODE will combine with proprietary genealogic and
genetic databases. In return, deCODE will pay all ex-
penses incurred by the government that are related to
deCODE’s effort to build and maintain the central
database—as well as an annual inflation-adjusted pay-
ment of 70 million KR (currently slightly less than
$700,000) and 6% of its annual pretax profit, up to an
additional 70 million KR (Icelandic Ministry of Health
and Social Security 2000). To put these figures in con-
text, we compare them to Iceland’s total public expen-
diture on health, which was slightly more than 40 bil-
lion KR in 1998 (National Economics Institute,
Iceland). Similar policies for benefit sharing were under
discussion prior to the collapse, in December 2000, of
the Framingham Genomics initiative (Kolata 2000a;
Rosenberg 2001) and have been used to recognize the
contributions of individuals and agrarian communities
in the developing world for their “traditional knowl-
edge” and technology relating to rare and useful agri-
cultural stock (Gupta 1998).
We believe it is unacceptable to presume that patients,
subjects, disease-associated advocacy groups, founda-
tions, and government (and, in turn, taxpayers) are all
pure altruists, as policies and practices now do presume,
especially when these stakeholders have contributed in
a meaningful way to the research enterprise. It is unfair
to these groups for their “investments” to be wholly
appropriated by firms or universities with no commit-
ment to return to the community something of value
that they can both access and afford. We believe that
there has been a market failure with respect to the value
added to the research enterprise by patient and subject
groups, and ways should be found to recognize and
reward their contributions. What that return should be
will vary depending upon the relative contributions
made.
Of course, there are economic concerns and practical
problems with the general claim that subjects should
share in the financial rewards of research. Subjects often
stand to benefit indirectly as consumers from any new
knowledge and therapies that result from research in
which they participate. This is a reasonable claim as
long as prices neither extract exorbitant profits from the
subjects nor create unfair limitations on access. In ad-
dition, the contribution of individual subjects may be
quite minimal, given that they bear little physical, psy-
chosocial, or financial risk from the research. Subjects
could be compensated by up-front payments for their
time, pain, and effort, and, although this may make
research more expensive because it is not contingent on
the success of the studies, such compensation is a rea-
sonable way to acknowledge individuals’ roles and the
expected value of their contributions. Alternatively, pro-
viding individuals with any share of potential profits
(e.g., royalties) may simply be unmanageable, and the
burden of such royalties might provide a disincentive
to downstream investment unless they are reasonable
and manageable. A middle ground would be to distrib-
ute, for example, a single share of stock in any bio-
technology business venture associated with the re-
search, because it might be worth very little unless the
research is successful. Perhaps a new class of preferred
subject-class stock could be created for this purpose.
Thus, unless there is some group that represents par-
ticipants, there may be no good way to recognize and
reward individuals’ contributions. Of course, represen-
tative organizations are not always present or involved.
Although there are many disease-associated advocacy
groups, there remain many diseases that have either no
collective representation or limited collective represen-
tation, and many individuals may not be affiliated with
the groups that do exist. Nonetheless, when an advo-
cacy group is present, it is likely that researchers will
work with the group if they see that the group increases
the ability to perform their research. If the group con-
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tributes too little or demands toomuch, then researchers
may look for individual participants separate from the
group. Advocacy groups thus serve two functions: add-
ing value by facilitating research and providing a col-
lective voice to individual participants, backed by the
power to negotiate and frame the ways in which re-
search and commercialization take place.
Entities involved in the commercial aspects of re-
search (including companies and universities that de-
velop intellectual property portfolios from which roy-
alty revenues can be earned) should be expected, as a
matter of public policy and research ethics practice, to
openly negotiate with foundations and disease-associ-
ated advocacy group and to resolve issues regarding
ownership, control of downstream use, limits on finan-
cial profit-taking from inventions, equitable profit shar-
ing, and other acknowledgments of all contributions
before the research is done. When individuals partici-
pate, researchers and institutional review boards should
consider the value that their contribution has toward
the performance of the research and should provide just
compensation. The claims made herein about benefits
sharing are based purely in equity and not property or
other rights; to put it simply, we believe it is the right
thing to do. For their part, subjects and disease foun-
dations must also be reasonable about what their con-
tributions are worth. Much more work needs to be done
to evaluate the relative value of contributions, perhaps
with the goal of the development of standards to be
used in these negotiations.
Acknowledgments
Supported in part by NIH grant HG02034, to Stanford Uni-
versity, and by a gift from deCODE Genetics and grants from
the Alpha-1 Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation, to
the University of Pennsylvania Center for Bioethics. J.F.M. re-
ceived a consulting fee from the Alpha-1 Foundation for legal
and ethical advice relating to intellectual property matters,
received an honorarium from the Canavan Disease Screening
Consortium for participation in a meeting between Canavan
Disease Screening Consortium members andMiami Children’s
Hospital, and has agreed to provide pro bono expert testimony
in the Canavan litigation. The opinions expressed are solely
those of the authors. We thank Marcie Merz and several anon-
ymous reviewers for comments about an earlier draft of the
manuscript for this article.
Electronic-Database Information
URLs for data in this article are as follows:
Genetic Alliance, http://www.geneticalliance.org/members.html
(for member list)
National Economic Institute, Iceland, http://www.ths.is/rit/
buskop/t0401.xls (for general government total expendi-
tures from 1980 to 1998)
Office of Technology Transfer, PHS/NIH, http://ott.od.nih.gov/
NewPages/TTstats00.pdf (for NIH technology-transfer ac-
tivities from fiscal year 1993 to fiscal year 2000)
References
Angell M (2000) Is academic medicine for sale? New Engl J
Med 342:1516–1518
Berg K (2001) The ethics of benefit sharing. Clin Genet 59:
240–243
Bergen AA, Plomp AS, Schuurman EJ, Terry S, Breuning M,
Dauwerse H, Swart J, Kool M, van Soest S, Baas F, ten Brink
JB, de Jong PT (2000) Mutations in ABCC6 cause pseu-
doxanthoma elasticum. Nat Genet 25:228–231
Beskow LM, BurkeW,Merz JF, Barr PA, Terry S, Penchaszadeh
VB, Gostin LO, Gwinn M, Khoury MJ (2001) Informed
consent for population-based research involving genetics.
JAMA 286:2315–2321
Brody B (1996) Public goods and fair prices: balancing tech-
nological innovation with social well-being. Hastings Cent
Rep 26:5–11
Cho MK, Shohara R, Schissel A, Rennie D (2000) Policies on
faculty conflicts of interest at US universities. JAMA 284:
2203–2208
DeAngelis CD (2000) Conflict of interest and the public trust.
JAMA 284:2237–2238
Eisenberg RS (1996) Public research and private development:
patents and technology transfer in government-sponsored
research. Virginia Law Rev 82:1663–1727
Greenberg v Miami Children’s Hospital, case 00C-6779 (ND
Illinois 2000)
Gupta AK (1998) Rewarding local communities for conserving
biodiversity: the case of the honey bee in protection of global
biodiversity: converging strategies. In: Guruswamy LD,
McNeely JA (eds) Protection of global biodiversity: con-
verging strategies. Durham: Duke University Press, pp
180–189
Heller M, Eisenberg R (1998) Can patents deter innovation?
the anticommons in biomedical research. Science 280:698–
701
HUGO Ethics Committee (2000) Statement on benefit-sharing.
Clin Genet 58:364–366
Icelandic Ministry of Health and Social Security (2000) Agree-
ment between the Minister for Health and Social Security
and Islensk erf-agreining egf. relating to the issue of an op-
erating license for the creation and operation of a health
sector database, January 21. Ministry of Health and Social
Security, Reykjavik
Katz D, Merz JF (2000) Patents and licensing, policy, patenting
of inventions developed with public funds. In: MehlmanMJ,
Murray T (eds) Encyclopedia of ethical, legal, and policy
issues in biotechnology. New York: John Wiley & Sons, pp
854–866
Kaul R, Gao GP, Aloya M, Balamurugan K, Petrosky A, Mich-
als K, Matalon R (1994) Canavan disease: mutations among
Jewish and non-Jewish patients. Am J Hum Genet 55:34–
41
Kaul R, Gao GP, Balamurugan K, Matalon R (1993) Cloning
of the human aspartoacylase cDNA and a commonmissense
mutation in Canavan disease. Nat Genet 5:118–123
Merz et al.: Protecting Subjects’ Interests 971
Kolata G (2000a) Use of research is reconsidered. New York
Times, December 29:A19
——— (2000b) Who owns your genes? New York Times,
May 15:A1
Kreeger KY (2001) Science salaries. The Scientist 14:35
Krimsky S, Rothenberg LS, Stott P, Kyle G (1996) Financial
interests of authors in scientific journals: a pilot study of 14
publications. Sci Eng Ethics 2:395–410
Le Saux O, Urban Z, Tschuch C, Csiszar K, Bacchelli B, Quag-
lino D, Pasquali-Ronchetti I, Pope FM, Richards A, Terry
S, Bercovitch L, de Paepe A, Boyd CD (2000) Mutations in
a gene encoding an ABC transporter cause pseudoxanthoma
elasticum. Nat Genet 25:223–227
Lindee MS (2000) Genetic disease since 1945. Nat Rev Genet
1:236–241
Marshall E (2000) Genetic testing: families sue hospital, sci-
entist for control of Canavan gene. Science 290:1062
Moore v Regents of the University of California, 51 Cal 3d
120, 271 Cal Rptr 146, 793 P 2d 479 (1990)
Pennisi E (2000) Biomedical research: patients help track down
disease gene. Science 288:1565–1567
Rosenberg R (2001) Questions still linger on Heart Study ac-
cess: private industry’s right to use publicly funded data for
profit remains at issue. Boston Globe, February 21:D4
Smaglik P (2000) Tissue donors use their influence in deal over
gene patent terms. Nature 407:821.
US Code, title 35, sec 202(c) (2001)
Weijer C (2000) Benefit-sharing and other protections for com-
munities in genetic research. Clin Genet 58:367–368
Weijer C, Emanuel EJ (2000) Ethics: protecting communities
in biomedical research. Science 289:1142–1143
Weir RF, Horton JR (1995) DNA banking and informed
consent—part 2. IRB 17:1–8
